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ARGUMENT 
1. Marshaling of Evidence: 
Appellee first states that Appellant has failed to marshal the evidence 
regarding specific findings of facts, but Appellee's argument is misplaced. 
The obligation to marshal the evidence objecting to a specific finding of fact 
is certainly a burden which must be borne when an appellant is contesting 
specific findings of fact. See, State v. Gamblin, 1 P.3d 1108 (Utah 2000): 
To demonstrate that a finding of fact is clearly erroneous, the 
defendant "must first marshal all the evidence that supports the 
trial court's findings. After marshaling the supportive 
evidence, the appellant then must show that, even when 
viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial 
court's ruling, the evidence is insufficient to support the trial 
2 
court's findings. (Also quoted in State v. Widdison, 28 P.3d 
1278 (Utah 2001) 
In the case at bar, Appellant does not contest or argue with any of the 
trial court's findings of fact, but rather, appeals the trial court's refusal to set 
aside the default judgment arising from the failure of Appellant to "arrange a 
mutually convenient time to meet regarding a discovery plan." (transcript, p 
148). 
In Dishinger v. Potter, 2001 UT App 209, 47 P.3d 76 (Utah App., 
2001), an unlawful detainer case, appellee Potter argues that appellant fails 
to marshal the evidence. The appellate court states: 
Potter next argues the Dishingers . . . have also failed to 
marshal the evidence. . . . Moreover, the marshaling 
requirement applies only when challenging findings of fact, 
[citation omitted] Clearly, the Dishingers are not challenging 
findings of fact. Rather, they are challenging the trial court's 
application of the law to the jury's special verdict findings and 
thus the Dishingers do not have the burden of marshaling the 
evidence. Id. at paragraph 30 
As there is no contest in the matter at bar regarding the facts of the 
case and there is no reference to the Findings of Fact entered by the Court, 
there is no need by Appellant to marshal the evidence either in support of or 
against the factual record in this matter. Hence, Appellee's argument is 
specious and without any argumentative value. 
2. Jurisdiction: 
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For Appellee's second and last argument, Appellee argues that the 
Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction in this matter due to an untimely appeal 
by Appellant. 
a. Pertinent Dates: 
i. The final judgment in this case was entered on 
December 17, 2003. Appellee's Brief, pg 15, third paragraph) 
ii. Appellant timely filed a Rule 60(b) Motion to Set 
Aside Default Judgment on February 10, 2004 which is within 
the ninety (90) days provided in Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 60(b). 
iii. The trial court denied Appellant's Rule 60 (b) motion 
on April 5, 2004. 
iv. This appeal from the Court's ruling of April 5, 2004. 
was filed on May 5, 2004. 
b. Timeliness: Appellee states that Appellant's Motion for 
Reconsideration (filed on October 20, 2003 in response to Appellee's 
proposed and unsigned Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) was filed 
after the time for Notice of Appeal expired. Appellee's argument is in 
error, as Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration was disposed of by the trial 
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PMH'l on November ?A, )|l<» I ami i\ mil «i oiisiilered m .Appellant's appeal or 
in the timeline of essential facts get i i lai le tc • tl le • ::asc • at bar. 
Appellee further misstates the facts by erroneously claiming that 
Appellant's Notice of Appeal was filed beyond the thirty days allowed for 
filing an appeal after the entry of a final judgment. As stated, the Final 
Judgment wv* nik/inl i Daniilin I \ .'Oli.i nv\\ Rule <>0(b) motion 
to set aside judgment was filed fo '• - limit ^ \ much, <" n I \ Ja -s 
allowed by Rule 60(b) and the Notice of Appeal was timely filed within 
thirty (30) days following the denial of the Rule 60(b) motion. 
1 Iii fJotice of Appeal is timely under two separate scenarios in this 
i: natter. 
i. The Notice of A ppeal is cleai 1> Ill i lely ' itl I i espect to the 
trial court's denial of Appellant's Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the 
judgment Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to decide whether 
I he trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the 
judgn lei it of Decei i ibei 17. 2003. 
ii. ' I he Notice of Appeal is arguably timely with respect to the 
judgment rendered on December 17, 2003. Four Utah cases speak 
directly to the matter: 
\ A Rule 60(b) Motion Stays the Time for Filing an Appeal: 
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a. Valley Bank and Trust Company v. Gerber, 526 P.2d 
1121 (Utah, 1974) states 
The timely filing of any of the motions allowed by 
the rules to attack or change the findings and judgment 
invokes the continuing jurisdiction of the court and 
suspends the running of the time on the judgment until 
the motion is ruled upon. l Id. at 1124. 
b. Arnica Mutual Insurance Company v. Schettler, 768 
P.2d 950 (Utah, 1989) states: 
If Schettler believed the trial court erred in denying his 
first motion to set aside the default judgment, the 
appropriate remedy was by direct appeal within the 
prescribed 30-day period. Schettler chose instead to file 
a second post-judgment motion and the time for filing a 
notice of appeal with this Court on his first 60(b) motion 
continued to run. Id. at 970. 
B. A Rule 60(b) Motion Does Not Stay the Time for Filing an 
Appeal: 
a. Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318 (Utah, 1987) 
states: 
Treating the motion under Rule 60(b)(1) or (7) 
likewise does not save this appeal and prevents us from 
reaching the merits of the trial court's original order. A 
Rule 60(b) motion does not extend or toll the thirty-day 
period in which appeals in the original action must be 
filed. Id. at 1319. 
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b. >.ttrwrv. Schrieverl V,M\ H/ 11 H.ih , 21II10) states: 
1he court of appeals correctly observed that a 
motion filed pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
"does not extend or toll the thirty-day period in which 
appeals in the original action must be filed." Id. at 446. 
There appears to be somewhat of a conflict regarding whether a Rule 
60(b) motion stays the time for filing an appeal from a final judgment. 
Rule 60(b) motion does i i . * -, 
if a party is allowed ninety days under Rule 60(b) to file a motion to set 
aside a judgment and the motion is denied, justice is denied to the movant if 
the movant is precluded from filing an appeal of the final judgment under 
if the Rule 60(b) motion is granted. 
successful Rule 60(b) ruling stays the time for appeal but an unsuccessful 
Rule 60(b) ruling does not stay the time for the appeal. 
Tl lei efoi e, in order to assure constancy in application of the rules, 
Apprlhnl ni"i?cs (his < 'omul Iiu ,i<lopl J IIIIIIIJ' lli.il „i \U\Ui (»0|b) ninlinn, 
whether successful or unsuccessful, stays the time for filing an appeal from a 
final judgment. 
1
 While a footnote only refers to Rule 59(b), Rule 60 should be applicable since it is a rule "allowed by the 
rules to attack, or change the . . . judgment 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellee's Brief consists of two concise arguments, which, if they 
applied to the case at bar, would be considered well argued. However, as 
Appellant does not contest the Findings of Fact in this matter, only the lower 
court's refusal to set aside a default judgment, there is no necessity for 
Appellant to marshal the facts and evidence. 
Second, Appellee's argument that the Court of Appeals lacks 
jurisdiction is unsupported by the facts or the law. The Notice of Appeal of 
the denial of the Rule 60(b) motion which is a final, appealable order, was 
timely filed following the lower court's denial of Appellant's Rule 60(b) 
motion. 
Finally, by concentrating on the two above arguments which have no 
application in this matter, Appellee has failed to respond to Appellant's 
arguments in chief regarding the lower court's abuse of discretion. As 
argued in its case in chief, the lower court's entry of a default judgment 
based upon the failure of Appellant's counsel to arrange for a discovery 
conference is a clear abuse of discretion. The sanction of a default 
judgment is extremely harsh, is not favored in the law and should not be 
approved by this Court. The lower court may have been justified in 
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granting sanctions of attorneys' fees or a civil fine, but to throw the case out 
of court for failure to initiate a telephone call is much too harsh for our 
modern practice. 
Therefore, as there is no opposition to Appellant's arguments 
presented in its initial brief, Appellant prays that the appeal be granted as 
prayed and that Appellant be granted its attorneys' fees and costs incurred in 
presenting this reply brief. 
ROBERT D. ROSE 
Attorney for Appellant 
PROOF OF SERVICE 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Appellant's Reply Brief to: 
Randall Gaither 
159 West 300 South 
Suite 105 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
on the 13th day of December, 2004. 
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